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On the eve of the third anniversary of the
Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission
to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July 2006 and
in the wake of the social unrest which
gripped Honiara in April 2006, it is timely
to reflect on the role and efficacy of the
intervention mission. Such reflection also
comes at a time when RAMSI is being lauded
in foreign policy circles as a new, innovative
and largely successful model for international
interventions aimed at addressing the
phenomenon of ‘state failure’. Whilst RAMSI
has undoubtedly made considerable progress
in the areas of law and order and economic
recovery, and whilst a majority of Solomon
Islanders continue to support the mission,
there are also significant and growing voices
of dissent emanating from within certain
sectors of Solomon Islands’ state and society.
Moreover, local criticism of RAMSI has
sharply intensified following the recent civil
unrest which saw widespread looting and
the almost complete destruction of the
Chinatown district of Honiara.
The purpose of this article is to present
and examine some of these dissenting voices.
I have collected these perspectives over the
past six months or so, in the course of
conducting research into the ‘ethnic tension’
over the period 1998–2003. I have formally
interviewed around 50 people and held
informal discussions with many more.
These people include ex-combatants, former
and current police officers, politicians, public
servants, journalists, representatives of
non-government organisations, church and
community leaders, taxi drivers and
villagers. I cannot claim to have conducted a
comprehensive, or even representative,
survey of the general populace’s views on
RAMSI. However, these conversations, in
combination with other sources, such as local
media and non-government organisation
reports and letters to the editor, nevertheless
provide useful insights into local perspectives
on RAMSI.
It is important to stress from the outset
that the overall picture is one of continued
support for the mission. However, the history
of conflict in Solomon Islands indicates that
it is perilously dangerous to ignore the
dissenting views of a minority of people.1
These views are presented against a
backdrop of the recent unrest and also as a
counterpoint to a recently published Lowy
Institute report which is glowing in its praise
195
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 21 Number 2 2006 © Asia Pacific Press
for RAMSI (Fullilove 2006). Solomon Islanders
are conspicuously under-represented in
the list of persons consulted for the latter
report and I therefore seek to employ local
perspectives to challenge some of its specific
findings. The perspectives on RAMSI
examined here raise a number of consider-
ations for Australian policymakers. Most
importantly there is a need for RAMSI,
particularly its policing component, to
improve its public image and its connected-
ness and interaction with the Solomon
Islands’ community. Failure to do so will most
likely result in further challenges to the
mission’s authority and legitimacy and, more
importantly, further civil unrest and
hardship for the people of Solomon Islands.
What is RAMSI?
For most academic and policy commentators,
RAMSI is an interesting example of an
international intervention mission, an
exercise in ‘peace keeping’ and ‘state
building’. It has a particular structure,
composition and legal foundation. It has a
purpose and specific goals and objectives.
RAMSI’s most senior officer, Special
Coordinator James Batley, recently described
the structure and purpose of RAMSI for the
benefit of the newly elected Members of
Parliament (Solomon Star, 6 June 2006). He
stressed that it is a regional mission with a
two pronged legal foundation: a multi-lateral
treaty and a Solomon Islands Act of
Parliament known as the Facilitation of
International Assistance Act 2003 (the
‘Facilitation Act’). Fourteen countries
contribute to its police contingent (the
Participating Police Force, or PPF), five are
represented in its military element and eight
contribute to its civilian component. RAMSI
works in three broad areas: law and justice,
economic governance and machinery of
government. The purpose of the mission is
to ‘foster…a nation which is peaceful, well-
governed and prosperous’ (Solomon Star, 6
June 2006).
However, for people in Solomon Islands,
RAMSI is a very different animal. RAMSI
means vastly different things to different
people across both time and space. From the
moment of its arrival (which occurred at
different times in different places) the
mission has been the subject of much
speculation, rumour, intrigue and even
mystique. Some people continue to believe
that RAMSI is an almost supernatural force
which is capable of dealing with any
imaginable contingency. However, this myth
of inviolability has, to a considerable extent,
eroded over time. The ‘shock and awe’
generated by the initial deployment of RAMSI
has largely worn off. People are keenly aware
of challenges to the mission’s infallibility,
such as the fatal shooting of Adam Dunning
in late 2004 which indicated that RAMSI did
not, after all, have ‘machines’ which would
find all of the guns which hadn’t been
surrendered. The failure of the PPF—which
is mostly comprised of Australian police
officers—to prevent two days of rioting
which resulted in the destruction of the
Chinatown district of Honiara, has added to
these growing perceptions of RAMSI’s
weakness. According to an ex-combatant
and former follower of Harold Keke with
whom I recently spoke on the Weather Coast
of Guadalcanal, ‘people are no longer afraid
of RAMSI’.
It is fair to say that the majority of the
predominantly rurally based population of
Solomon Islands identifies RAMSI as
primarily, if not exclusively, a police and
military operation. Most people are not aware
of the economic governance and machinery
of government components of the mission.
Nor are they versed in the nuances of
acronyms and technical distinctions,
particularly the difference between RAMSI
and PPF. For most people, RAMSI basically
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means police and soldiers, most of whom are
Australian and all of whom are under the
command of Australian officers. One person I
spoke to on Malaita even went as far as saying
that RAMSI should be called ‘AMSI’ (the
‘Australian Mission to Solomon Islands’).
Having said this, there are, of course,
Solomon Islanders who are very familiar with
the full scope of the RAMSI mission, and
some local politicians and public servants
have voiced concerns about the economic
governance component of the mission in
particular. I have dealt with these concerns
elsewhere (Allen 2006).2 The primary focus
of this article is on the policing component
of RAMSI, which for the majority of people
in Solomon Islands is RAMSI. In the
remainder of the article, ‘RAMSI’ is used to
refer to the PPF and the military, just as it is
in the common parlance of Solomon
Islanders.
A light touch?
One of the eight positive features of RAMSI
highlighted by Fullilove is its so-called light
touch:’physically it adopts a fairly low
profile. RAMSI arrived in the Solomons
under cover of darkness’ (Fullilove 2006:17).
No doubt the people who were in the Malaita
Province capital of Auki when RAMSI staged
an ultimately unsuccessful operation to
capture fugitive ex-policeman Edmund Sae
in 2003 would strongly disagree with this
assessment. In that instance, RAMSI
emerged from the sea at dawn, just near the
market place, in the form of navy commandos
dressed in black wetsuits and fully-armed
and equipped. The early morning betelnut
vendors at the market fled in fear, as indeed
did most of the townsfolk. The commandos
were followed by large numbers of regular
troops who landed in the mangroves adjacent
to Auki. For many people on Malaita this was
interpreted not as a low profile intervention,
but as a large-scale and explicit invasion of
the island.
Similarly, in the aftermath of the riots on
18 and 19 April (dates which are referred to
locally as ‘Black Tuesday’ and ‘Black
Wednesday’), the people of Honiara were
subjected to the almost constant low-altitude
circling of RAMSI helicopters, at one stage four
of them at once. Heavily-armed RAMSI
personnel, including military reinforcements,
had an extremely high profile on the streets
of Honiara (as, in fact, they did when RAMSI
was originally deployed in July 2003).
Parliament House was ‘locked down’ by the
Commissioner of Police (Shane Castles, an
Australian) and other strategic locations,
such as the Magistrate’s Court and High
Court, were guarded by armed RAMSI police
and soldiers.
Whilst it is true that the main RAMSI base
(known as Guadalcanal Beach Resort or GBR)
is located on the outskirts of Honiara, out of
sight from the main road, it is a stretch to argue
that this means that ‘the infamous white four-
wheel drives are out of sight’ (Fullilove
2006:17). It is not white four-wheel drives, but
marked police four-wheel drives with PPF
number plates which ply up and down the
main road of Honiara. These vehicles are
somewhat more ubiquitous than Fullilove
would have us believe. Moreover, many of the
provincial RAMSI posts can hardly be
described as discrete. In some remote rural
locations, such as on the Weather Coast of
Guadalcanal, RAMSI personnel are based in
fenced compounds with 24 hour-a-day
generator-powered security lighting. The
compounds contain an array of impressive
equipment such as speed boats, vehicles and
quad-bikes. As the rules prevent the PPF
officers from consuming any locally produced
food, or even rainwater, these bases are
regularly re-supplied by helicopters operated
by Patrick Defence Logistics.
The many innocent Solomon Islanders
who have directly experienced the punitive
197
PACIFIC ECONOMIC BULLETIN
Policy dialogue
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 21 Number 2 2006 © Asia Pacific Press
might of RAMSI would also be unlikely to
endorse the ‘light touch’ imagery. A case in
point is an ex-Royal Solomon Islands Police
(RSIP) officer with whom I recently spoke in
Auki. He was arrested on a charge of assault
and later acquitted. The first time RAMSI
officers attempted to arrest him, neither he
nor his wife were at home. However, his three
young children and their house girl were at
home when the house was raided in an anti-
terrorist style operation by 11 land cruiser-
loads of heavily-armed police and soldiers.
They came through the doors and windows,
terrifying the children whom to this day run
in fear at the sight of a ‘white man’. On
Malaita there are many such stories of heavy-
handed operations and a growing resentment
that RAMSI officers do not respect local
custom, with the most common complaint
being that they trespass on traditional tribal
lands without seeking proper permission.
On several occasions people on Malaita said
to me ‘mifala save hatem RAMSI’ (‘we hate
RAMSI’).
Successful communication with
Solomon Islanders?
According to Fullilove, another aspect of
RAMSI’s light touch is its ‘diligent and
largely successful efforts to communicate
with Solomon Islanders…an openness and
humility which is entirely appropriate for an
international mission’ (Fullilove 2006:17). A
majority of Solomon Islanders distinguish
between PPF officers on the basis of their
nationality. Pacific islanders are the most
popular because they ‘come down to the
people’.3 Australian officers are the least liked.
They are perceived as arrogant and aloof. New
Zealand officers are regarded as being some
where in the middle. Interestingly, the military
are preferred to the PPF because they walk the
streets and talk to people. The PPF, on the
other hand, are rarely seen outside of their
ubiquitous police vehicles.
In a Melanesian country such as Solomon
Islands, successful communication depends
on building relationships of trust. Ongoing
interaction and exchange are the keys to
developing such relationships, even if it is
only friendly words that are being exchanged.
The PPF’s deliberate isolation from the
community—the location of its base on the
outskirts of Honiara, its refusal to consume
locally produced foodstuffs, its reluctance to
have its people walking the streets, the
inability of the majority of its people to speak
Pijin, the high rotation of rate of its officers
through the provincial posts and through the
operation as a whole—is inimical to this
process of interaction and exchange.
The recent civil unrest in Honiara
raises a number of serious concerns about
RAMSI’s ability to communicate and build
relationships with Solomon Islanders.
Commissioner of Police Shane Castles
primarily blames a lack of intelligence, and
consequent lack of preparation, for the
inability of the police to prevent the rioting,
looting and arson. However one would have
thought that after almost three years in the
country, the PPF would have established an
effective network of contacts within the
community from which it could draw its
intelligence. The admission of a lack of
intelligence is also, therefore, an admission
that RAMSI, and the PPF in particular, is very
poorly integrated and connected with the
local community. This situation cannot
reasonably be described as one of successful
communication with Solomon Islanders.4
Furthermore, the ability for police to be
able to communicate effectively with
members of the public is crucial in any crowd
control situation in any part of the world.
During the events which occurred outside
Parliament on the afternoon of 18 April, the
inability of the front line PPF police (most of
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whom were Australian) to speak or even
understand Solomon Islands Pijin may be
regarded as a significant strategic
disadvantage. A former RSIP officer told me
that in the past, the RSIP has been able to
diffuse the vast majority of civil disturbance
situations through negotiation and effective
communication with the crowd. According
to John Roughan,
[h]ow can the [Australian] Federal
Police’s professional conduct be taken
seriously when some of them were
unaware that the word ‘waku’ is Pijin
for Chinese people. What does this say
about the Police’s lack of social
integration with the people of this
nation? (2006:2).
The public debate around the role of the PPF
during the civil unrest has also raised issues
concerning the cultural appropriateness
of the RAMSI approach. For example, a
Solomon Islander writing in the ‘Private
View’ section of the Solomon Star states
I believe the situation could have been
cool down if only RAMSI officers
stopped using teargas and let Sir Peter
Kenilorea (the Speaker) address his
own people (Solomon Islanders) on
what he has according to the mediation
process and restorative justice, which
are deemed appropriate to Melanesian
situation…Therefore let me advise the
RAMSI officers and military units, if
there is any disagreement arises
between the leaders and indigenous
people of this country (Solomon
Islands) please allow Melanesians
themselves to take the first approach
to try and solve their own internal
matters and affairs (Solomon Star, 27
April 2006).
Did RAMSI contribute to the riots?
Detailed analysis of the causes of the recent
unrest in Honiara is beyond the scope of this
paper and is dealt with elsewhere (Allen
2006). It is suffice to say that the riots were
caused by a number of factors, not least of
which was widespread frustration with the
outcome of the April National Election and
the subsequent ‘second election’ for the new
Prime Minister. However, part of this
frustration can be attributed to RAMSI. The
general public has voiced considerable
dissatisfaction with RAMSI’s inability or
unwillingness to arrest the so-called ‘big fish’
in relation to crimes committed during the
‘ethnic tension’ period from 1998 to 2003.
Whilst a number of high-profile parliament-
arians have been arrested and charged with
tension-related offences, notably Benjamin
Una and Alex Bartlett, there are widespread
feelings that RAMSI has not gone far enough.
Since the arrival of RAMSI in July 2003
there have been almost daily appeals in the
letters to the editor and editorial sections of
the local newspapers to arrest the ‘big fish’,
including former Prime Minister Sir Alan
Kemakeza. These appeals have intensified
following the publication in late 2004 of an
Auditor-General’s report into the disburse-
ment of a US$25 million loan from a Tawainese
bank for which Kemakeza assumed overall
responsibility at the time as Minister for
National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace
(Solomon Islands 2004) and the subsequent
arrest of Lucien Ki’i, who was Kemakeza’s
Permanent Secretary at the time, on corruption
charges relating to the disbursement. The
return to power of the same ruling coalition,
headed by Kemakeza’s heir apparent (Snyder
Rini) was, for many people in Solomon
Islands, the final fatal act in a process of mass
political disempowerment and would appear
to have immediately precipitated the rioting
which broke out on Black Tuesday.
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There is also evidence to suggest that
RAMSI officers and vehicles were
deliberately targeted during the riots. It
appears that only PPF officers sustained
injuries and only PPF number-plated vehicles
were destroyed during the unrest. Moreover,
torched PPF vehicles and Chinese-owned
businesses were graffitied with obscenities
against RAMSI, an indication of the strong
negative feeling towards RAMSI expressed
to me by a number of people on Malaita. One
cannot, therefore, discount the possibility
that the riots were partly aimed at attacking
RAMSI. However, regardless of whether or
not RAMSI contributed to the riots, there can
be no doubt that the events have been
disastrous for RAMSI’s image, with members
of the public cynically remarking that the
military and police reinforcements were too
late, just as the original deployment of RAMSI
came long after the open armed conflict in
Solomon Islands was over.
Conclusion
This paper has examined some local
perspectives on RAMSI which are not
commonly heard in academic and policy
discourse about the intervention mission. It
has been argued that the RAMSI of ‘state
building’ and ‘nation building’ is markedly
different to the RAMSI which is seen and
interpreted by Solomon Islanders. For the
majority of people in Solomon Islands
RAMSI means police and soldiers. Moreover,
it is widely perceived as an Australian-
dominated enterprise, composed mostly of
Australian security forces which are
commanded by Australian officers.
Regrettably, the Australian police, who do
indeed make up the bulk of the PPF, are the
least liked. They are regarded as arrogant and
isolated. They do not walk the streets, they
do not shop at the markets and they do not
talk to people. They stay locked up in their
conspicuous vehicles and bases. They raid
suspects’ houses in anti-terrorist style
operations. They lack local language skills
and knowledge of indigenous culture and
custom. They have a serious image problem.
The way in which RAMSI operates also
means that it, particularly the PPF component,
experiences severe difficulties with commun-
icating, interacting and building trust with
the Solomon Islands community, including,
it would seem, the RSIP. It is therefore hardly
surprising that the PPF had no intelligence
about the riots of Black Tuesday and Black
Wednesday. Nor does it come as a surprise
that they were unable to negotiate with and
diffuse the angry mob, as the RSIP has been
able to do in the past. Yet it must be remembered
that RAMSI currently has sole responsibility
for maintaining law and order in Solomon
Islands. If it cannot prevent a significant
section of Honiara from being destroyed in
mob violence then what exactly is it doing in
Solomon Islands (and, it should be noted, at
vast expense to the Australian taxpayer)?
However, the situation is by no means
hopeless. Despite the recent challenges to its
authority and inviolability, RAMSI continues
to enjoy the support of a majority of people
in Solomon Islands, including the new
Sogavare government (albeit with some
reservations about the economic governance
component of RAMSI). Moreover, the improve-
ments in the way that RAMSI operates—as
suggested by the dissenting voices considered
here—are by no means impossible. There are
pragmatic steps that can be taken to address
the related issues of RAMSI’s poor integration
and interaction with the local community
and its negative public image. These include
improved language and cultural awareness
training; an improved community engage-
ment and communication strategy; and
greater integration with RSIP and the
community as a whole. It is expedient for
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Australian policymakers to consider such
measures. Failure to do so will increase the
likelihood of further instability in Solomon
Islands, to the detriment of all involved, not
least of whom are the good citizens of
Solomon Islands.
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Notes
1 According to the Pacific Islands Forum
Eminent Persons Group which conducted a
review of RAMSI in 2005 ‘[t]here are some
critics of RAMSI: some of those criticisms may
be valid; others reflect a vested interest in
RAMSI’s early departure. Although those
with such interests are a minority, their
potential for causing disruption should not
be underestimated’ (2005: para 12).
2 Following the precedent set by the PNG
Supreme Court in striking down the
immunity provisions for Australian police
under the Enhanced Cooperation Program
(ECP), there have also been challenges to
RAMSI’s legal foundation. In late 2005 former
Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) ‘spokesman’ and
prominent local lawyer and ex-politician,
Andrew Nori, launched a High Court
challenge to the legality of RAMSI arguing
that the Facilitation Act was unconstitutional.
The case was recently struck down by the
Chief Justice in a lengthy judgment (Andrew
Gabriel Hanaipeo Nori v. Attorney-General
and others [2006]). Before his arrest on
charges in relation to the riots,
parliamentarian Charles Dausabea, who also
had close connections with the MEF, criticised
aspects of RAMSI during an interview with
Radio New Zealand (Radio New Zealand, 25/
04/06). He stated that as a newly-elected MP,
he was planning to scrutinise aspects of the
Facilitation Act, particularly the Immunity
Clauses which grant RAMSI officers
immunity from prosecution under the laws
of Solomon Islands. It was also widely
rumoured that Dausabea campaigned on an
anti-RAMSI platform in the lead-up to the
April 5th National Election.
3 According to the Eminent Persons Group:
‘We also heard that the Pacific islanders
serving under the PPF are well liked among
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Solomon Islanders. In our view this is because
Pacific Islanders can relate well to the locals’
(2005:para 33).
4 According to former RSIP Assistant
Commissioner, Mike Wheatley, the events
of what he describes as ‘RAMSI Tuesday’ (that
is, 18 April 2006) were not the result of a
failure of intelligence, but of a failure of
commonsense. ‘If forces had been pre-
deployed as per usual Solomon Islands
procedures and operational experience then
there would not have been any
surprises…The looting and burning of shops
in Chinatown after a demonstration of some
kind is a known scenario. It has been
attempted on many occasions in the past and,
each time, successfully blocked by Solomon
Island disciplinary forces’ (2006:3–4). This raises
further questions concerning the relationship
between PPF and RSIP officers. To what extent
was advice sought from, or proffered by, RSIP
officers? To what extent was such advice
followed by PPF commanders? What is the
nature of communication between RSIP and
PPF?
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